INQUISITORIAL ACTIVITIES OF DVORKIN AND HIS PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE POWER

“Power, power comes first…” 

The article “Legalized Sadists. The Totalitarian Sect of Dvorkin” elaborates on one of the striking examples of modern totalitarianism — the activities of Alexander Dvorkin’s international totalitarian sect, which propagates Nazi ideologies of superiority. The piece describes Dvorkin’s sect as a unique hybrid of inquisition, political Orthodoxy, Soviet-style communist repression, and totalitarian Nazi ideology.

The article presents evidence of how Alexander Dvorkin, a covert sadist suffering from severe psychological disorders not only infiltrated the executive branch of power, but under the guise of having success in “fighting sects,” has also influenced the legislative and judicial branches in Russia. The activities of Dvorkin’s destructive sect and his personal shadowy rule led to incitement of interethnic and interreligious hatred, an increase in public dissatisfaction, distrust toward government institutions, a loss of trust in the rule of law and in anyone’s ability to demand its enforcement, systematic slander in mass media, and the fabrication of numerous administrative and criminal cases against various religious groups, public organizations, and private individuals. The article provides evidence of how Dvorkin’s sect psychologically conditioned and “brainwashed” state officials, law enforcement representatives, and socially active citizens with extremist and terrorist ideology.

As a result of these actions, Dvorkin, a self-proclaimed “expert on totalitarian sects,” has significantly bolstered the shadow justice system in Russia, escalating corruption in areas meant to uphold law and order and protect citizens’ rights and freedoms. The sect’s direct involvement in establishing the shadow justice system has grown so systemic that it has become a societal epidemic.

To continue the discussion, let’s examine the origins of Alexander Dvorkin’s ideas about seizing power, considering his history of manic-depressive psychosis, and how he implements these ideas into practice. Dvorkin’s pathological drive for control, stemming from his nature as a covert sadist, is evident in his public activities, domineering rhetoric, self-assigned titles, and the conclusions he emphasizes in his lectures, interviews, articles, and even the roles he assigns himself in life. This man clearly lives by ideas of his own omnipotence, attempting to combine the roles of high priest and president within the scope of his influence, encroaching upon the state’s prerogative to punish and pardon.

Dvorkin imagines himself as nothing less than a high-ranking state official, wielding powers of “imperial authority.” He conducts mock trials against those who do not bow before him (as though before God) or do not submit to his sect with its extremist-terrorist ideology. Over 30 years of destructive activities, he has labeled numerous law-abiding citizens as “sectarians” and branded them as “state criminals.”

Perjury is a routine part of Dvorkin’s everyday life. This is not surprising. Psychiatric practice shows that psychopaths with diagnoses like Dvorkin’s have a strong need for psychological and physical dominance over others. They harbor a deep conviction that the reins of power must be only in their hands, by any means necessary. To expand his influence, Dvorkin created his international totalitarian sect. Psychopaths like Dvorkin aim only for victory in their struggle for power because failure would expose all their lawlessness. Much of what he publicly accuses others of is, in fact, what he and his adherents are guilty of themselves.

Dvorkin’s Quote: “The essence of a sect is power, power comes first, money afterward. Above all, it is about power. Of course, power amplifies money, and money further increases power. Money will be taken later. At first, there is an absolutely free gift, for which it turns out you must pay three times the price.” ¹

Dvorkin’s Quote: “This is an organization whose primary purpose is power and money for its leadership, characterized by such traits as deception during recruitment, manipulation of followers’ consciousness, exploitation of followers, regulation of all aspects of their lives, deification of the leader and/or organization, and so on.” ²
Dvorkin’s Quote: “And finally, what is new is the totalitarianism of modern sects, their merging with international business, media, and often with the intelligence services of certain states.” ³

Delusions of Grandeur

The article “Alexander Dvorkin’s Medical Files: Full Archive” outlines documents attesting to Dvorkin’s mental health problems. Note that from 1973 to 1977, he was under observation at the Moscow Psychoneurological Dispensary with a diagnosis of cyclothymia, previously known as manic-depressive psychosis. Patients with schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis are often diagnosed with a condition referred to in psychiatric terminology as “delusions of grandeur.” 

Given the facts of Dvorkin’s public life and activities, it is evident that he exhibited this condition. It is characterized, among other things, by inadequate behavior. For instance, exaggerated self-image, making categorical and unprovoked statements, impulsive behavior, excessive gesturing, and unpredictable mood swings.

Delusions of grandeur (also known as megalomania, megalomaniac delusions, or expansive delusions) are a pathopsychological syndrome in which the patient overestimates their own importance, abilities, and personality traits. This is a type of thought disorder characterized by a persistent belief in one’s own superiority. The patient often exhibits inappropriate behavior, assuming the roles of a famous, brilliant, or extraordinary individual endowed with power. The individual expresses delusions of their own omnipotence and higher calling, and may believe themselves to be a king, president, emperor, or even god. In this state, they tend to be aggressive, impulsive, insistent, and expansive in defending their delusional ideas, and are prone to irrational and unmotivated actions.

It should be noted that delusions of grandeur fall under qualitative thought disorders and are associated with focal or diffuse brain damage of various origins (traumatic, metabolic, or vascular). In such cases, the patient experiences distortions in the process of logical information processing. 

The complex process of intellectual activity is disrupted. This occurs at the stage of interpreting perceived and recalled information. The patient develops beliefs that do not correspond to reality and cannot be corrected, yet the judgments and conclusions appear entirely logical to them.

The public life and activity of the sadist Alexander Dvorkin vividly demonstrate the step-by-step development of this psychopathological syndrome — delusional disorder with a megalomaniacal narrative. Judging by medical records, in the early stages of the illness during childhood, Dvorkin was convinced he was superior to others in terms of personal qualities. His behavior followed accordingly: he acted arrogantly, boastfully, presented himself as the hero of books he had read, and loved to fantasize, which earned him the dislike of his peers.

The next stage of delusional self-perception is his belief in the uniqueness of his own personality, based on reasons he clearly fabricated. This belief apparently solidified during Dvorkin’s youth, amid the full bloom of his bouquet of mental disorders.

Finally, the peak of Dvorkin’s mental disorder came in his mature years. Patients like Dvorkin often act and think from the position of a delusional identity and are guided by a distorted version of reality. For instance, they may see themselves as important, influential figures (such as a president, emperor, or god) and make decisions based on this delusional self-assessment.

If Dvorkin’s mental illness had unfolded within the confines of a treatment facility, no one would raise the issue. But since this mentally ill individual is active in public life — and not only has infiltrated major authorities, but is also attempting to manipulate and influence those at the levers of power in a nuclear state — certain risks arise.

A simple example of how Dvorkin, an impulsive and ambitious personality, currently presents himself to the public: three-time “president” (self-appointed), three-time “professor”  (unconventional way of acquiring the title), the “leading cult expert in the country” (an illegal, self-proclaimed “expert” who declared himself the head of the anticult movement in Russia). He also poses as a “reader” (up until 2024, at the Holy Trinity Church in Khokhly, Moscow), covertly seizing power within Orthodoxy. This “reader” is a behind-the-scenes orchestrator of smear campaigns: he secured the expulsion of Archpriest Alexiy Uminsky (the former rector of that Moscow church), is waging a “war” against the current rector Tkachev, and has already succeeded in having many Orthodox priests defrocked, banned from ministry, and removed from active service.

In addition, he commands an international network of his own sectarian adherents embedded throughout the missionary departments of the Russian Orthodox Church. He weaves intrigues and schemes against the current Patriarch, clearly aiming for his swift removal — a topic that will be covered in more detail below.

So the only people likely to believe in Alexander Dvorkin’s claimed titles and ranks are those who are unaware of how this mentally unwell individual:

• appointed himself “president”;
• with the help of his former student Alexander Konovalov (who at the time served as minister of justice), illegally secured the position of chair of the Expert Council on State Religious Evaluation under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation; introduced legislative amendments that created conditions for gross violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms, plunging the country into mass repression;
• created an international totalitarian sect based on the missionary departments of the Russian Orthodox Church and perverted Orthodoxy;
• and how he obtained his professorship.

Almost President of the Country

It is also evident that Alexander Dvorkin has a strong desire to be seen as important and to control the minds of the masses — he wants to be revered no less than, and perhaps even more than, the president and the Patriarch combined. Apparently, as someone mentally unstable, Dvorkin didn’t just secretly envy and hate those higher up the power ladder — he actively imitated them, dreaming of becoming the president of all presidents, a high priest commanding even the actions of the Patriarch. Sadists like Dvorkin usually conceal their true intentions. However, as the saying goes, “by their deeds you shall know them.” Sometimes maniacs reveal their nature, exposing their real motives.

Here is a clear example. In 2009, Alexander Dvorkin apparently ordered his sectarian subordinates at “RACIRS” to write about him as if he were the “president of a country,” betting that a naive and gullible public would take it at face value. In that article, Dvorkin was portrayed in the style of a head of state on an official visit abroad. The language mimicked formal reports on presidential business trips — his schedule, agendas, working meetings, high-level talks with ministers, government officials, security service representatives, meetings with scientists, the public, journalists, faculty, and students. 

Even the concluding summary of the business trip, the public’s interest in certain issues, and the stated intent of both parties to engage in bilateral cooperation were copied and reworked — all to glorify the image of the “president” of the totalitarian sect “RACIRS” —  Dvorkin. The only thing missing, it seems, was a crowd scene for the photos — apparently, they couldn’t manage to assemble a convincing audience.

What do you think was Dvorkin’s aim in planting and shaping that image of himself in people’s minds back in 2009?

[03/20/2009] President of RACIRS Professor A. Dvorkin Conducted a Working Visit to the Republic of Kazakhstan

Left to right: Chairman of the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan A. Doszhan, President of RACIRS Professor A. Dvorkin, Director of the International Center of Cultures and Religions A. Abuov.

From March 16 to 18, 2009, Professor Alexander Dvorkin, President of RACIRS, made a three-day working visit to the capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, at the invitation of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Zagipa Baliyeva, and the Director of the International Center for Cultures and Religions under the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan (ICCR), A. P. Abuov.

The purpose of the visit was to hold meetings and deliver lectures to government and municipal officials, academics, university faculty, and to give television interviews on the prevention of harmful effects of totalitarian sects, their role in promoting religious extremism, and the nature and objectives of state religious evaluation.

On his first day in Astana, Professor Dvorkin participated in two events. In the afternoon, he held a meeting at ICCR with civil servants, educators, and law enforcement officers. In the evening of March 16, he met with the faculty of the L. N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University.

At the entrance of the Cathedral of Saints Constantine and Helen. Left to right: ICCR Director A. Abuov, Archimandrite Serapion, Professor A. Dvorkin.

On the morning of March 17, a three-hour national remote seminar and consultation was held titled “The Role of Religious Evaluation in Preventing the Spread of Religious Extremism.” The seminar was coordinated by L. Danilenko, head of the Evaluation and Registration Division of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and chaired by A. Doszhan, Chairman of the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Justice. Civil servants from all 16 regions of Kazakhstan with relevant responsibilities participated in the event.

That same evening, Professor Dvorkin gave an in-depth live interview on two leading television networks in Kazakhstan — ”Khabar” and “Kazakhstan.”

On the morning of March 19, accompanied by ICCR Director A. P. Abuov, Professor Dvorkin visited the Cathedral of Saints Constantine and Helen, where he met with the Cathedral’s rector, Archimandrite Serapion, the dean of the Astana Church District of the Kazakhstan Metropolitan District. Later that day, Professor Dvorkin held meetings with the faculty of the Academy of Public Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan and with officials from the Astana Akimat (city administration).

Professor A. Dvorkin with staff of the International Center for Cultures and Religions.

All the aforementioned meetings were marked by the active participation of attendees, which reflected both the high relevance of the agenda of combating the negative consequences of totalitarian sects and occult movements, and a strong interest in the Russian experience in sectology.

The busy program of RACIRS President prof. A. Dvorkin’s visit to the Republic of Kazakhstan helped enhance the fight against the dangerous social consequences of totalitarian sect activity through the mutual exchange of experience in this area, including experience accumulated by RACIRS and its affiliated organizations over the years.

The President of RACIRS and representatives of the host country expressed their intention to continue developing and strengthening bilateral professional cooperation.

RACIRS Executive Secretary Priest Lev Semyonov, PhD in History, Associate Professor

One can understand Dvorkin’s meetings with government officials, law enforcement personnel, and church leaders. All of it is part of his broader strategy to expand his international totalitarian sect, seize influence, and create conditions for unlawful mass repression — punitive crackdowns on so-called “sectarians.”

But what truly raises questions is Dvorkin’s particular and consistent interest, during his travels, in engaging with university and college faculty — and even preschool teachers. Why is Dvorkin so intent on reaching out to educators, whether poor or well-off, so long as they’re intelligent?

The answer is simple: teachers shape the minds of children and students — the future professionals across various fields. It always remains unknown which of these students will eventually rise to positions of power or leadership. But a teacher, already conditioned by Dvorkin’s Nazi-extremist ideas, is already within his reach. Which means there’s always access to the minds of even former students — through their instructors. Meanwhile, Dvorkin remains in the shadows, secretly manipulating information and remotely directing the process of psychological conditioning of a former student who may now be, say, a politician. Yet officially, as always, Dvorkin “has nothing to do with this.”

And who would think anything bad about this oddish man, a lecturer waving his arms erratically and stammering every other word? Who, upon first meeting, would realize that he’s a covert sadist who has built an international totalitarian sect using Nazi methods and extremist-terrorist ideology? Probably only a specialist of the relevant field. Who would imagine that while you’re listening to this strange individual, he’s actually “conditioning your mind,” shaping you into a tool of genocide?

In fact, even his speech disorder — his logoneurosis — seems to be something Dvorkin uses to manipulate his opponent’s mind. As a rule, when listening to him, a person typically notices the pathology of his speech, and in response, they either mentally sympathize with him or, conversely, gloat at his misfortune, imagining themselves as vastly superior. Either way, while their attention is diverted by his manner of speech, their vigilance drops and critical thinking shuts down. It’s during that window, it seems, that Dvorkin implants his “subliminal implants” directly into the subconscious — coding yet another sectarian slave. Implants that can alter a person’s life — and in some cases, the fate of an entire nation.

A demonstrative example of how Dvorkin uses educators to achieve his power goals can be found on the website of the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons — in the publication “S. V. Kiriyenko and Scientology.” The story goes like this: in 2017, Dvorkin’s subordinates “accidentally” discovered a 2001 interview with Sergey Kiriyenko, meaning they revived a topic that was advantageous to them 16 years later. They published a copy of this article on their website, explaining that the question “Is it true that Kiriyenko is a Scientologist?” was allegedly one of the most common questions Dvorkin was asked during his public lectures across the country.

Now, the article also provides an explanation for why Dvorkin is so active in lecturing to educators. In this interview, Kiriyenko says that “I was found by my university philosophy professor,” who “at that time began working on the problem of sects.”

S.V. KIRIYENKO AND SCIENTOLOGY. Press release from RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons — 02/13/17

It has long been rumored that Sergey Kiriyenko is somehow connected to Scientology. One of the most common questions asked of Prof. A. Dvorkin during his public lectures across the country is: “Is it true that Kiriyenko is a Scientologist?”

Recently, staff members of the Center for Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons, accidentally discovered an old (2001) interview with Sergey Vladilenovich Kiriyenko in which he himself answers this question. Here it is:

Kiriyenko denies adherence to Hubbard’s teachings

 —  Please answer: how do you reconcile the worldview of Hubbard’s Dianetics with the worldview of the Orthodox Church?

 —  I can say nothing about Hubbard’s Dianetics because I have never been his follower and am not one now.

By the way, I can turn the question back in a rather blunt way.

Because indeed, when I was heading the Nizhny Novgorod branch of a commercial bank, some bank employees took courses at the Hubbard College — not in a religious system but in a course related to management basics. Moreover, I myself signed up for this course, but I was warned in time and did not complete it.

But note, I was not warned by a representative of the Orthodox Church; my university philosophy professor found me. Luckily, it was at that time that he began working on the problem of sects, and after reading some works and learning that I was going to take the course at the college, he brought them to me in a folder and said, “Under no circumstances do this. I will now tell you everything about them, what this really is.”

And if he had not come? And, forgive me, let me still ask the question: “Where was the Orthodox Church? Who was watching them as they attracted huge numbers of people, many enterprises? Who was overseeing the advertising, seminars on advanced training and management that they conducted, which actually stood for much more serious things?”

A serious question, isn’t it? It is a question for the opposition, if you want. Because, as it is said, “if there is a gap, something will fill it,” then as in the Criminal Code: “an act equals inaction.”

Christ has risen!

“Orthodox Newspaper” Yekaterinburg No. 17 (158)

June 15, 2001

And further in this article, we read the following from Dvorkin’s Center: “And now it’s worth recalling that it was our Center that was the first to speak out about the dangers of Scientology. Our work began as a subdivision of the Synodal Department for Religious Education and Catechization. And that very same former university professor, who at the time began studying the problem of sects, did so in cooperation with our Center and received his initial information about Scientology precisely from the materials we published.”

Let’s think about it: would Sergey Kiriyenko, a high-ranking employee of the Nizhny Novgorod-based “Garantia Bank” at the time, have listened to the Russian Orthodox Church? Would its opinion have carried any authority for him then? Probably not.

And now it’s worth recalling that it was our Center that was the first to speak out about the dangers of Scientology. Our work began as a subdivision of the Synodal Department for Religious Education and Catechization. And that very same former university professor, who at the time began studying the problem of sects, did so in cooperation with our Center and received his initial information about Scientology precisely from the materials we published.

So, Sergey Vladilenovich, you avoided Scientology precisely because of a warning that originally came from a church-affiliated structure. And we are very glad that you eventually became an Orthodox Christian.

Truly the Lord has Risen!

Press Center of RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons

In essence, this reveals Dvorkin’s destructive and manipulative scheme — how he conditions the minds of individuals closely connected to the object of his interest. It shows how Dvorkin secretly and remotely manipulates this target, implanting the narratives and directives he needs into their mind through third parties. Read here https://actfiles.org/legalized-sadists-the-totalitarian-sect-of-dvorkin/

on how he manipulated Vladimir Putin, altering his perception of reality. And this case is not the only one.

Would you be interested in learning how Dvorkin established close ties with professors at the Faculty of Law at Saint Petersburg State University (SPbSU) — the very same faculty that educated President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, former President Dmitry Medvedev, heads of several Ministries, federal agencies and courts, and prominent legal scholars? In fact, these former students represent the elite of today’s ruling class. So how did Dvorkin — a man who for 30 years has been sowing the seeds of Nazism and extremism in people’s minds — exert influence over the minds of those running the country, over the minds of those who had no idea that Dvorkin was manipulating and controlling their opinions, their access to information, and even their lives?

The events of 2009 speak volumes and serve as powerful evidence — this was the peak of Dvorkin’s totalitarian-extremist sect. The year 2009 became a turning point in Dvorkin’s plans to monopolize and usurp power.

2009
Let us briefly recall the events of 2008–2009.

• In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev became President of the Russian Federation (May 7, 2008 – May 7, 2012), replacing Vladimir Putin. For figures like Dvorkin, this year was a windfall — a time of sweeping changes and an opening to high-level power. The key events began in late 2008.
• On December 5, 2008, at the age of 79, Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Rus’, Doctor of Theology and Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, passed away. It was under Patriarch Alexy II that Dvorkin established his public organizations (Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons and Russian Association of Centers for Religious and Sectarian Studies, RACIRS), both of which were affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. In fact, Dvorkin was laying the foundation of what would become his own totalitarian sect.

The Reason for Becoming a Sect Fighter

However, there is an interesting fact that mustn’t be ignored, especially in the context of the entire prior biography of this so-called “sectologist.” As far back as 1993, the Moscow Patriarchate began openly lobbying for a change to the existing religious legislation, focusing its efforts on limiting the missionary activities and operations of its competitors in the “religious marketplace” — namely, new, non-Christian, or non-Orthodox organizations beyond its jurisdiction. 

In December 1994, the ROC (MP) Bishops’ Council passed a special resolution on the matter, and over time, this policy only intensified. For an ambitious and energetic anticultist like Dvorkin, a much broader field of activity now lay open — moreover, “with guarantee.” It’s hard to say who first used the term “crusade” against those of other faiths, but it fits perfectly. And Dvorkin was the ideal candidate to lead such a crusade.

It was during this period that Dvorkin not only gained access to the top ranks of the ROC, but also discerned their political ambitions and weak spots. Given his hyperactive efforts during that time, one thing is clear: Dvorkin was refining his manipulation techniques in practice by getting others to speak and act in ways that, in fact, served his own lust for power and secretly held ambitions. He created situations and conditions where the voices of those he controlled were not only heard by the powers that be, but actually began to influence them. There is ample evidence of this, and it will be discussed further below.

At the time, Dvorkin’s public anticult activity was supported by his ally and friend, the well-known theologian and Orthodox “sect fighter,” Deacon Andrey Kuraev. In the early 1990s, Kuraev served as the official speechwriter and assistant of Patriarch Alexy II. In this role, Kuraev earned the informal nickname “Deacon of All Rus’” for his vanity and overblown self-importance.

Andrey Kuraev: Has the Russian Orthodox Church Fallen Ill with Totalitarian Sectarianism?

For Dvorkin, this period was ideal for testing and refining his manipulative techniques and powers, including the use of third parties to exert influence on his target of interest. Together with Kuraev, they launched an active public struggle between the ROC and religious movements that were outside the jurisdiction of the ROC (MP).

The once-powerful anticult movement in the United States was eventually destabilized and bankrupted by a series of lawsuits. In Russia, however, thanks in large part to Alexander Dvorkin, Father Andrey Kuraev, and a number of lesser-known allies, it began gaining noticeable power starting around 2000–2001, and especially after 2005. Dvorkin began presenting a much more respectable public image — which made sense, given the stature he was assuming. Still, as an impulsive and ambitious personality, he never quite shed certain traits from the “early period” of his career.

It must be said that the most problematic thing about the work of Dvorkin and his Center was the confusion of concepts. He lumped into one pot some of the painful phenomena of a transitional society, the poverty-induced dependence on rich foreigners, real attempts to use psychological influence techniques during recruitment, and the fundamental Christian opposition “church vs cult.” He threw all of this into one ideological pot and set it to boil over the political ambitions of the ROC (MP) hierarchs — which by then had decided to transform itself into a de facto “Department of State Religion.”

In 1996, Kuraev was appointed Professor of Theology by Patriarch Alexy II. Around the same time, Alexy II also granted Dvorkin the honorary title of “Professor.” This patriarchal patronage and the “bestowed” title opened doors for Dvorkin into a world of opportunity, introducing him to a wide network of “useful” contacts, including many at the international level.

“Three years earlier, Dvorkin had been expelled from the Faculty of Journalism at Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU). On December 3, 1997, the dean of the faculty, Yasen Zasursky, terminated Dvorkin’s contract — he had been teaching a course on Church history — citing the ‘professor’s’ lack of the ‘academic qualifications required to teach at the university level.’

Teaching Career

Nevertheless, Dvorkin’s academic career at the Orthodox St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University of the Humanities (STOUH) — which was officially granted university status by Russia’s Ministry of Education in spring 2004 (prior to that, it had operated as a theological institute) — proved far more successful. Dvorkin is indeed a “professor” there, because in the ROC (MP) this title is awarded not so much for scholarly merit or teaching achievements as it is a form of honorary distinction granted by the Patriarch. Unsurprisingly, he heads the Department of Sectology, and his work there has been quite successful. 

In addition to lectures delivered in Russia and Brussels, STOUH reports that Dvorkin’s department engages in ‘systematic anticult activity,’ and that ‘A. Dvorkin and Deacon M. Plotnikov actively cover cultist issues in numerous radio and television appearances, and regularly publish materials on the subject in both church and secular press — domestically and abroad.’ The department also runs a counseling center, where Dvorkin and his staff take calls, receive individuals ‘victimized by cults,’ and provide consultations on how to break free from their harmful influence. For all this, and on the occasion of his 50th birthday in 2005, Dvorkin was awarded the Order of St. Innocent of Moscow by Patriarch Alexy.

Nevertheless, despite his success in pedagogical and educational activities, Dvorkin’s main activity remains primarily anticultist.”

By 2008, Dvorkin had firmly entrenched himself within the patriarchal elite. This is why the death of Patriarch Alexy II likely came as an unwelcome turn of events. Especially since the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne (as of December 6, 2008) was Metropolitan Kirill (Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyaev).

• On January 27, 2009, the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church elected Metropolitan Kirill as Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’.
• On February 1, 2009, the enthronement of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’ took place at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

Patriarch Kirill

What was Dvorkin’s attitude toward the new Patriarch Kirill? Judging by Dvorkin’s initial behavior, it was ambiguous. Compare these two press releases from Dvorkin’s organizations, RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons. The first one is dedicated to the memory of Patriarch Alexy II, in which Dvorkin didn’t forget to mention his own “achievements,” whereas the second is a terse “congratulations” on the election of Patriarch Kirill. Even foreign delegations offered warmer words.

IN MEMORY OF HIS HOLINESS PATRIARCH ALEXY II (December 6, 2008)
JOINT STATEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF CENTERS FOR RELIGIOUS AND SECTARIAN STUDIES (RACIRS) AND THE CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN THE NAME OF HIEROMARTYR IRENAEUS OF LYONS

December 6, 2008
Moscow

The entire Orthodox world is today experiencing an immeasurable sense of grief, felt especially acutely by the millions-strong flock and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as by the Russian public. Bishops, priests, monastics, and laypeople have lost their father and shepherd. The Russian state and society as a whole have lost a wise figure of truly global stature.

The life of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II was defined by a single supreme calling and purpose — it was devoted to serving God and the Holy Church, warmed by his abiding love for his earthly homeland and its people. The life of this figure — indisputably one of the most significant in the Russian Orthodox Church — will undoubtedly become a subject of careful study by both church and secular historians.

Even today, it is clear that His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II, through his primatial ministry, defined an entire era in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. His nearly two decades on the Patriarchal throne encompassed a time of momentous historical change for both the Church and the country. Politically, this was a time of major upheaval and turmoil: the declaration of Russia’s independence, the dissolution of the USSR, and the difficult rebirth of a new Russia — all of which demanded titanic efforts.

Through this stormy sea of historical events, the Church ship was confidently and wisely steered by His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II from its captain’s bridge. In ecclesiastical history, his tenure as Patriarch was marked by extraordinary growth and flourishing. One needs only recall and compare the Church’s once dire and persecuted condition under decades of militant atheism with its current high standing in Russian society. As we know, the voice of the Patriarch came to be heard by the powers that be — and they listened. 

To this should be added the thousands of churches and monasteries, revived from oblivion or newly founded, the growth of middle and higher theological education, the development of church-state relations, and the expansion and deepening of the Russian Orthodox Church’s ties with other Orthodox Churches and with the other traditional religions of Russia.

Even a brief retrospective highlights significant milestones, such as the 2007 reunification of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, the adoption in 2000 of “The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,” and the decisions of the 1994 Bishops’ Council aimed at defending the purity of Orthodoxy from the onslaught of totalitarian sects and occult teachings. In this regard, we recall with great gratitude the blessing given by His Holiness the Patriarch in 1993 for the founding of the Information and Consultation Center in the name of the Holy Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons — later transformed in 2003 into the Center for Religious Studies.

Throughout the years, our Center continually felt his living primatial support. We recall the high praise His Holiness repeatedly gave in public to the work of our staff and to our director, Professor A. Dvorkin. We especially remember his statement in support of Prof. Dvorkin, made literally an hour after his illegal detention by the Yekaterinburg police in 2005. Finally, this support found fresh and visible confirmation during the Center’s 15th anniversary celebrations, when our staff received a warm greeting from His Holiness and were honored with high church awards. 

The Patriarchal blessing renewed in those days gives us new strength to confront the threats posed to Russians by the destructive activities of totalitarian sects and their enablers.

All his life, His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II was with the Church and with the people. It seems the milestones of his earthly journey bear the clear imprint of divine providence: the Lord called him to high primatial service at a time when it was especially difficult for both Church and country, and when the time came for visible stability in church and political life, the Lord called him home. Together with millions of faithful children of the Russian Orthodox Church, we believe that our Lord God will grant repose to the soul of His newly departed servant, His Holiness Patriarch Alexy, in a place of brightness, a place of verdure, a place of peace, where all the righteous dwell…

MAY HE BE REMEMBERED FOREVER!

President of RACIRS and Center for Religious Studies

Professor A. L. Dvorkin

Executive Secretary of RACIRS and Center for Religious Studies

Priest Lev Semyonov,

PhD in History, Associate Professor

Some recent revelations by Alexander Dvorkin’s former friend — Andrey Kuraev (now living in exile) — regarding the events of that period, particularly those surrounding the funeral of Patriarch Alexy II, are also noteworthy. These revelations raise questions about those involved in those events as well as those who may have profited from them.

Let us recall that the first sermon at the coffin of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy was delivered by Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov — a longtime friend of Dvorkin, his like-minded ally and “patron.” At that time, Smirnov chaired the Synodal Department of the Moscow Patriarchate for Cooperation with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies. After that, the eulogy at the beginning of the funeral service was given by the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad.

From an interview with Andrey Kuraev:

“…Malicious tongues say that Kirill’s reign began with what, from Putin’s point of view, was a major mistake. Namely, during the eulogy over Patriarch Alexy’s body, Kirill said that Patriarch Alexy had taken over the Church when it was weak and persecuted, but left it as a powerful nationwide institution. You see, translated into the language of political science, that’s a claim that this is a new institution of real power. Because political science holds as an axiom that the people are the source of power. Some say Putin took offense to those words.”

Working Ahead of the Curve: Kuraev on Patriarch Kirill and the Kremlin

Konstantin Eggert

February 29, 2024

Why does Putin trust Tikhon Shevkunov, and what is his true attitude toward Patriarch Kirill? How do kickbacks work within the ROC, and who stands a real chance of becoming the next patriarch? These are the questions addressed in the #inTRENDde interview with Deacon Andrey Kuraev, who now lives in exile.

“Yes, to prove it — “I’m yours, you bourgeois.” Moreover, malicious tongues say that Kirill’s reign began with what, from Putin’s perspective, was a major mistake. Namely, in his eulogy over Patriarch Alexy’s body, Kirill said that Patriarch Alexy had taken over the Church when it was weak and persecuted, and left it as a powerful nationwide institution. You see, translated into the language of political science, that’s a claim that this is a new institution of real power. Because political science holds as an axiom that the people are the source of power. Some say Putin took offense to those words. And so supporters of the current patriarch then persuaded the president that Kirill could still be allowed to take the throne, pointing out that Kirill had fainted during Alexy’s funeral. Kirill has had to claw his image back up from rock bottom in Putin’s eyes ever since — and so, he tries his hardest to prove: ‘I’m yours.’”

Interestingly though, who set up the future Patriarch Kirill like that? Who pre-scripted the eulogy with words that provoked such a reaction from Putin? Which “expert” advised or slipped the idea to the speechwriter to include that line in the future patriarch’s remarks? Who was the one originally driving a wedge between Putin and Kirill, secretly manipulating both sides, hating them both, stirring conflict through covert methods of influence?

Here’s what another “expert” — Dvorkin’s friend and “patron,” Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin — would later write about Patriarch Kirill. At the time, Chaplin was head of the Synodal Department for Church’s Relations with Society and had access to both secular and church authorities. Andrey Kuraev published an article “Chaplin on Patriarch Kirill” on his personal webpage:

“Rumors of the Patriarch being an ‘intellectual’ are greatly exaggerated. Yes, he’s a man of broad knowledge and quick wit. He can recall a historical fact useful in a discussion, quote something from his long-term memory or from something he recently read, say something striking or suggest a sharp edit to a draft. But in those moments, there’s no coherent worldview playing out in his mind, nothing he’s steadily developing. He simply tries to stay within the current boundaries of political ‘propriety’ and ‘permissibility,’ and most importantly, within the boundaries of Orthodox doctrinal norms and spiritual intuitions. He always stays within the first boundary — not once has this man openly rebuked those in power in a way that prompted a reaction. And without a reaction, what kind of rebuke is it? The second boundary, thank God, is usually kept too — though not always, as many critics have noted. However, the offhand remarks that have stepped beyond those boundaries don’t amount to a deliberate or clearly articulated heresy.

Written speeches for Metropolitan — later Patriarch — Kirill were usually prepared by people with operational thinking and well-formed views. For example, in recent years, the conceptual addresses at the World Russian People’s Council were written by Alexander Rudakov under my supervision. Theological texts were prepared by Metropolitan Hilarion’s team. My own team prepared texts on socially significant issues.”

• On February 17, 2009, RACIRS held its annual meeting, which showcased the active operations of Alexander Dvorkin and the expansion of the international activities of his RACIRS sect across both nearby and distant foreign countries. These included his trips to France, Italy, China, and Israel. The meeting also confirmed that it was RACIRS that organized the preparation and execution of the upcoming annual conference and General Assembly of FECRIS — an organization that holds consultative status with the Council of Europe — “where the primary burden of this work fell on the president of RACIRS, Professor A. Dvorkin, who serves on the FECRIS Board of Directors.”

RACIRS Expands Its Operations: Press Release from the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects on Its Annual Meeting

Moscow,  February 24, 2009

The annual meeting of RACIRS was held on February 17, 2009. The executive secretary of RACIRS, Priest Lev Semyonov, presented the activity report to the attendees. Over the reporting period, RACIRS had organized four international and domestic conferences within Russia and took an active part in the European Federation of Centres of Research and Information on Cults and Sects (FECRIS) conference held in Cyprus in July 2008, as well as in the pan-Orthodox meeting that took place there.

The report placed particular emphasis on the vigorous activity of RACIRS president Professor A. Dvorkin, who had been on official trips at the invitation of dioceses and regional authorities across many parts of Russia — from Kaliningrad to Sakhalin — where he delivered lectures and provided consultations. His international engagements during the reporting period were equally intense. His itinerary included France (Paris), Italy (Pisa), China (Beijing and Shanghai), and Israel (Jerusalem).

During the reporting period, RACIRS continued its core activities, coordinating collaboration among its affiliated centers and providing expert assessments upon request from judicial and law enforcement bodies, as well as from governmental and public institutions at both the federal and regional levels. RACIRS also initiated appeals to federal and regional authorities, as well as to print and electronic media, regarding various unlawful activities of totalitarian sects and the dangers they pose to Russian citizens and to Russian society as a whole.

A major focus of RACIRS during the reporting period was organizing the upcoming annual conference and General Assembly of FECRIS — an entity with consultative status at the Council of Europe. The report noted that the primary responsibility for this work was shouldered by Professor A. Dvorkin, President of RACIRS and member of the FECRIS Board of Directors.

In his report, Priest Lev Semyonov also highlighted a positive development: the steady growth in RACIRS membership. At the current annual meeting, four new member organizations joined the association — three of them from the Murmansk and Vyatka regions and the Chuvash Republic, and the fourth being another foreign RACIRS affiliate, this time in Ukraine. Recently, two more centers submitted applications to join the association and have already begun cooperating with RACIRS in practice. Their official admission will be considered at the next annual meeting.

“Everyone bows to the procession, and I cry out: ‘Hats off!’”

An interesting detail once again confirming Dvorkin’s delusions of grandeur and his internal thirst for power can be found in the same press release. It states that RACIRS President A. Dvorkin served as the “scientific consultant” for Pavel Lungin’s film “Ivan the Terrible and Metropolitan Philip,” and even played a cameo role as Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod, who presided over the episcopal consecration of Metropolitan Philip. It is worth recalling that Dvorkin once defended a thesis titled “Ivan the Terrible as a Religious Type.”

The tone and message of the film closely mirror Dvorkin’s current cultist activities, particularly his efforts to mobilize the state’s punitive and repressive machinery. The synopsis reads: “Dark times. The reign of Ivan the Terrible. Rus’ is torn apart by famine and the Livonian War. The ruler sees treason and betrayal everywhere. His loyal servants, the “oprichniki,” have flooded the country in blood. In everyone, they are ready to see an enemy of the Tsar.” Tellingly, the film does not portray the entire era of Ivan the Terrible, but focuses exclusively on the years of his conflict with Metropolitan Philip (1566–1568). The plot centers on a dramatic confrontation between two strong personalities — Ivan the Terrible and Metropolitan Philip, that is, the tsar and the high priest. Ultimately, the tsar orders Metropolitan Philip’s execution. This storyline is strikingly relevant, given the current developments in Russia and Dvorkin’s manipulative intrigues in the higher echelons of power — this backroom schemer, a master of manipulation and whisperer from behind the curtain…

It is worth emphasizing that Dvorkin was responsible “for the film’s historical accuracy,” a role for which he later faced a torrent of criticism from professional scholars of religion and history. He also acted as a consultant to the director. Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev (who was under Dvorkin’s direct influence at the time), commenting on the film, said:

“Is it a coincidence that the release of this film fell in the first year of the new patriarchate? Could it be that Patriarch Kirill is destined to inherit not only the throne of St. Philip, but also his cross? Might this film be a kind of spiritual testament from St. Philip to Patriarch Kirill?”

Professor of the Moscow Theological Academy, Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev, well known for his missionary work, emphasized the film’s “Christian and historiosophical credibility,” and stated:

“Is it a coincidence that the release of this film fell in the first year of the new patriarchate? Could it be that Patriarch Kirill is destined to inherit not only the throne of St. Philip, but also his cross? Might this film be a kind of spiritual testament from St. Philip to Patriarch Kirill?”

In light of the above-mentioned facts, it is revealing to examine Dvorkin’s mindset and his own attitude toward the film. Consider, for instance, an interview he gave in early 2009. The headline features a quote from Dvorkin himself: “Ivan the Terrible was not a great ruler.” One should understand that individuals suffering from the kind of psychological disorders that Dvorkin exhibits will never accept the authority of anyone but themselves. For such individuals, enthralled by delusions of grandeur, the only authority is themselves. Hence their frequent backroom criticisms on any convenient pretext, baseless accusations of mental illness directed at others — particularly people in power —  and their persistent indignation and patronizing tone.

In the spring of 2009, a new film by Pavel Lungin will be released, telling the story of the formidable Tsar Ivan IV and the holy martyr Metropolitan Philip of Moscow. The consultant on the film was STOUH professor A. Dvorkin, who once defended a thesis titled “Ivan the Terrible as a Religious Type.” He also had the chance to play the role of Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod.

Leonid Vinogradov, a correspondent for Neskuchny Sad magazine, spoke with Alexander Leonidovich about the upcoming film and the phenomenon of Ivan the Terrible’s popularity.

Alexander Dvorkin:

“Ivan the Terrible was not a great ruler”

Playing a saint

 —  Alexander Leonidovich, how accurate is the film historically? Can a work of art even be historically accurate?

 —  I believe Pavel Semyonovich Lungin is very committed to historical accuracy. He invited me to be a consultant, and I gladly agreed — I have a great appreciation for his work. On top of that, several priests I deeply respect also asked me to take part. I tried to help Lungin make the script as accurate as possible. At Pavel Semyonovich’s request and with my spiritual father’s blessing, I played a small role in the film as Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod, who presided over the consecration of Metropolitan Philip. Without knowing the rite of episcopal consecration, it’s impossible to stage or act it properly, and I was once a subdeacon, you know. 

So, we are rehearsing the moment when the newly consecrated metropolitan emerges to greet the people. The extras are standing in costumes, bowing to the procession, and I shout, “Hats off!” Everyone whips off their hats — only for the costume designer to rush in, shouting, “Anything but that!” Because under the hats, everyone had wigs that came off with them. So they canceled the hat removal. You have to put up with that kind of thing.

There are some historical anachronisms — certain earlier or later events have been inserted into the plot. This is acceptable in a dramatic work; it helps reveal the characters more fully within the brief time frame the story unfolds. But overall, I was struck by how much the director worked to recreate the era down to its tiniest details.

According to Dvorkin, he tried to “make the script as accurate as possible” — in other words, he helped write certain scenes for the film. That means he had a clear opportunity to insert manipulative elements aimed at the “crowd,” shaping public opinion in the context of the country’s current political climate. All the more so since the film’s subject matter is conveniently aligned with the situation, and Dvorkin was aware of “palace intrigues” and had his own specific goals. Given his delusional disorder centered around a messianic complex, it’s no surprise that Dvorkin chose to play the role of the man who elevates to power the high priest of the state — a figure to whom the masses submit at the wave of a hand. This is, after all, the secret dream of a person with such a psychological diagnosis.

Moreover, understanding that the film will be shown to a wide audience for years to come, it is worth examining exactly what Dvorkin emphasizes. Specifically: what worldview, what mindset, and what behavioral model Dvorkin suggests to the “crowd” as he speaks about the film — especially in light of today’s dynamics between the political and religious figures in the country. Who teaches whom, and who dominates whom? What is Dvorkin himself fixated on, and what kind of behavior is he inciting in others?

For example, in the article “Ivan the Terrible was not a great ruler,” Dvorkin, using historical examples from Ivan the Terrible’s time, draws attention to the idea that perjury is normal in certain circles. He prompts readers to consider how beneficial it would be, when drafting a document, to picture everything completely the opposite of what it was, to “fabricate guilt” for an opponent and “thereby justify themselves and their actions against him.” Incidentally, this is essentially the foundation of Dvorkin’s entire anticult movement, all his “anticultism,” and the activities of his totalitarian sect, RACIRS: accusing others of what he and his followers are guilty of themselves.

The Time of Troubles is the Inevitable Consequence of Any Despotism

 —  “The Hagiography of Saint Philip” was compiled in the late 16th century based on the testimony of Stepan Kobylyn, the warden who held him in custody, and several surviving Solovetsky monks who had earlier borne false witness against the metropolitan at the 1568 Church Council. Because of this, some admirers of Ivan the Terrible believe that the hagiography is not to be trusted. In particular, they claim that Malyuta Skuratov did not kill the saint but arrived after he had already died.

 —  It’s true that those monks bore false witness against the metropolitan. And Stepan Kobylyn brutally abused him. But think about it from a worldly perspective — such people would have found it more advantageous, when composing the hagiography, to present everything the other way around, to fabricate guilt on the part of Metropolitan Philip and thereby justify themselves and their actions against him. Yet the holiness of the Metropolitan transformed these individuals, leading them to genuine repentance. They confessed their betrayal and evil deeds. That is exactly why their testimony can be trusted.

According to Dvorkin, the popularity of a ruler is “fueled by myths.” Moreover, “the popularity of a ruler” “is, above all, a consequence of the current crisis in the state.” “In such moments, people tend to feel nostalgic for a ‘strong hand’ — for rulers who were feared and respected both at home and abroad.” He says the ruler “was easily influenced — not just by other people, but by his own theories. Even when reality directly contradicted his ideas, he stuck to these schemes. That is not a sign of a strong character. And more importantly — look at the fruits. Yes, in the first half of his reign, there were major achievements in foreign policy. But after that…”

Even the conquest of new territories — “the only territorial expansion in the final years of his reign” — wasn’t the ruler’s achievement. The territories were conquered and then “presented to the ruler,” and “he graciously accepted them into his domain.” He launched the war “against the advice of competent counselors and waged it ineptly. He effectively rallied a coalition of all Northern Europe against himself, and when there was still a chance to end the war on favorable terms, he failed to take it.” “As a result, we lost that war — and with it, access to critically important coastal territories.”

And then Dvorkin takes it even further, citing a historical example to stress how important it is for a ruler to be surrounded by religious advisors — implicitly, people like Dvorkin himself. Because without them, the ruler is nobody. The tsar, he writes, “was still under the influence of a truly great historical figure — Metropolitan Macarius. I believe the credit for the conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan belongs much more to Saint Macarius, to the priest Sylvester, and to the enlightened men who advised the tsar at that time — again, on Metropolitan Macarius’s recommendation.”

 —  So what is the reason for Ivan the Terrible’s popularity today? In your view, was he, despite his cruelty, a great ruler?

 —  I want to distinguish between people who simply see Ivan the Terrible as an extraordinary ruler and thinker, and those who are calling for his canonization. While their positions do overlap to some extent, with the former it’s still possible to have a dialogue based on facts and reasoning.

Ivan the Terrible’s popularity as a ruler is, above all, a consequence of the current crisis in our state. In such moments, people tend to feel nostalgic for a ‘strong hand’ — for rulers who were feared and respected both at home and abroad. Psychologically, this phenomenon is understandable. But in many cases, such popularity is fueled by myth.

Undoubtedly, Ivan the Terrible was a vivid, extraordinary figure — an exceptionally educated man for his time, well-read even in theology, and a talented writer. But he was not a great ruler! A true ruler must have strength of character and a clear grasp of reality, while Ivan the Terrible was easily influenced — not just by other people, but by his own theories. Even when reality directly contradicted his ideas, he stuck to these schemes. That is not a sign of a strong character.

And more importantly — look at the fruits. Yes, in the first half of his reign, there were major achievements in foreign policy. But after that… even the conquest of Siberia, the only territorial expansion in the final years of his reign, wasn’t Ivan the Terrible’s achievement. Yermak set out on that expedition on his own initiative, practically without the tsar’s knowledge. When the conquered lands were presented to Ivan, he graciously accepted them into his domain.

As for the Livonian War, he launched it against the advice of competent counselors and waged it ineptly. He effectively rallied a coalition of all Northern Europe against himself, and when there was still a chance to end the war on favorable terms, he failed to take it. As a result, we lost that war — and with it, access to critically important coastal territories.

At the start of Ivan’s reign, the Crimean Tatars were vassals of Moscow and paid tribute. We were on the verge of fully conquering Crimea. But it ended with the Crimean Tatar army reaching Moscow and burning it.

Ultimately, all of this led to the Time of Troubles, and it was only through the unity of the people that the state was saved. The results of Ivan the Terrible’s reign are disastrous.

 —  What about the capture of Kazan?

 —  The capture of Kazan was a great achievement. If Ivan IV’s reign had ended there, we might have evaluated him very differently. But he ruled for many more years after that, and things only got worse.

At the time of the Kazan and Astrakhan campaigns, Ivan was still under the influence of a truly great historical figure — Metropolitan Macarius. I believe the credit for the conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan belongs much more to Saint Macarius, to the priest Sylvester, and to the enlightened men who advised the tsar at that time — again, on Metropolitan Macarius’s recommendation.

An interesting line of reasoning, considering today’s realities, isn’t it? Did you notice the tone of disdain in how he spoke about the ruler’s image: “But he was not a great ruler! A true ruler must have strength of character and a clear grasp of reality.” And this tone isn’t limited to that one historical figure — it’s a recurring element in Dvorkin’s rhetoric as a whole. Psychopaths like Dvorkin, who suffer from a pronounced delusion of grandeur, are always jealous of those whom the public elevates — whether they be figures of the past or the present.

Another key point is Dvorkin’s description of the “oprichnina” — the historical phenomenon from the era of Ivan the Terrible, a state mechanism that prepared the social ground and executed brutal governmental repressions. Its structure bears a strong resemblance to the architecture of Dvorkin’s own modern-day totalitarian sect. “Ivan the Terrible created his own monastic order to carry out a kind of inquisition, with himself as its abbot.” “…The oprichniki did vow to renounce everyone outside the oprichnina (including their own parents), pledging absolute obedience to the head of the order.”

 “…The oprichnina truly divided the country, leading to its devastation and mass killings. But notably, Ivan the Terrible created it based on Catholic and Protestant models instead of the Orthodox ones. Though he surely saw himself as Orthodox, his Orthodoxy was highly peculiar.”

“When I was researching the oprichnina, I realized the Tsar modeled it after the Dominican order. Its symbol — a dog’s head and a broom — echoes the Dominicans’ own emblem: a dog’s head and a bunch of olive branches. In the Middle Ages, the Dominicans were called Domini canes — the ‘Dogs of the Lord’ (a Latin pun). The Dominicans administered the Inquisition, and Ivan the Terrible created his own monastic order to carry out a kind of inquisition, with himself as its abbot. Unlike Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy doesn’t have extraterritorial monastic orders independent of diocesan structures, but the oprichnina became exactly that. Historian Karamzin once claimed the oprichnina was a parody of monasticism, but that’s not quite right. Ivan IV essentially founded a real monastic order. The oprichniki didn’t vow celibacy. He borrowed that trait from the Lutheran knightly orders he encountered in the Baltics during the Livonian War. But the oprichniki did vow to renounce everyone outside the oprichnina (including their own parents), pledging absolute obedience to the head of the order.

At the start of his reign, at the Stoglav Council, Ivan the Terrible timidly raised the issue of limiting monastic land ownership. A large portion of state land belonged to monasteries and was exempt from taxation. And so, Ivan the Terrible brought up this matter only to receive a sharp rebuke from Metropolitan Macarius and the Stoglav Council fathers, who made it clear that a Tsar shouldn’t interfere in Church property. Ivan the Terrible accepted the ruling, but later effectively resolved the issue in his favor by creating the oprichnina. He reclaimed monastic land, all while believing he remained within the framework of the Stoglav’s rulings. After all, having created a new monastic order — and appointing himself as its abbot — the transfer of lands into the oprichnina wasn’t, in his eyes, a seizure from the Church, but simply a shift from one monastic jurisdiction to another. The establishment of a parallel Church jurisdiction, however, was a schismatic act, and the oprichnina truly divided the country, leading to its devastation and mass killings. But notably, Ivan the Terrible created it based on Catholic and Protestant models instead of the Orthodox ones. Though he surely saw himself as Orthodox, his Orthodoxy was highly peculiar.”

A bit of history about the Tsar’s oprichniki. According to historical records, the formation of the “oprichnina army” began in 1565, when a detachment of 1,000 men was assembled, recruited from the oprichnina territories (districts). These individuals served, when needed, as the Tsar’s trusted agents, tasked with intelligence, security, investigative, and punitive functions. Eventually, the number of oprichniki reached 6,000, and oprichnina voivodes and commanders (“golovy”) emerged. The symbol of the oprichnina was a dog’s head and a broom. “This symbolized that they would first bite like dogs, and then sweep away all that was unnecessary from the country,” as recorded in historical documents by Livonian nobles Taube and Kruse. “The oprichniki soon became a scourge and an object of hatred for the people.” “Many people were accused of treason and exiled to various cities. The property of those executed or exiled was confiscated by the Tsar and distributed among the oprichniki…” ²¹

Nineteenth-century historian Vasily Klyuchevsky wrote: “Contemporaries understood that while eliminating sedition, the oprichnina actually introduced anarchy under the guise of protecting the Tsar and shook the very foundations of the state. Directed against the imaginary sedition, it prepared the ground for the real one.”

Apparently, Dvorkin studied this historical phenomenon quite thoroughly and applied it in practice. Let us remind you that the article “Legalized Sadists. The Totalitarian Sect of Dvorkin” mentioned Christmas Readings — the annual church-public forum, which was first held in 1994 just one year after Dvorkin’s official launch into anticult activity. Officially, this church-public forum is chaired by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’. But Dvorkin skillfully exploited the forum’s resources to consolidate his own power, spread a Nazi-style (anticult) ideology of superiority of some over others, and expand the ranks of his sectarian oprichniki.

Starting in 1994, the Christmas Readings drew over 1,000 attendees from various regions of Russia! Today, this forum gathers more than 5,000 participants, and it has section chairs, co-chairs, and supervisors, including clergy, government officials, and experts in education, sociology, and culture. In other words, people who work directly with the public, shape public opinion with their “expert opinions,” collect and supply information, and carry out investigative and punitive tasks. All of them are people whom Dvorkin can utilize in his “inquisitorial activities.”

And let’s be honest: for building his own shadow empire of covert power, Dvorkin needs this structure. Above all, he needs it to create the right conditions to incite hatred and defamation in the media, using various “talking heads” from his sect — a group made up of officials, clergy, academics, and all manner of “experts.” Then, based on the lies inflated in the media, law enforcement can be pressured into unlawful actions, thus becoming complicit in the crimes committed by Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect. And there you have it — a battalion of modern-day oprichniki. Striking parallels with historical reality, don’t you think?

Just like the oprichniki of time of Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a full-blown inquisition, Dvorkin and his adherents operate in the same way. First, they “bite” through slander, public defamation, and dehumanization in the media, flagrantly violating people’s rights and freedoms. Then they “sweep away all that is unnecessary from the country” by creating conditions that allow for anti-democratic legal amendments, thanks to which entire groups of people and organizations are deemed “undesirable” and forced out of the country, while those who remain are labeled “extremists.”

Has anyone stopped to think about how this will all end? The same way the oprichnina terror under Ivan the Terrible ended: in the end, the very people closest to the Tsar — the top leadership of the oprichnina — fell under repression. Even the Tsar’s personal favorites were accused of treason (oprichniki like the Basmanovs, Prince Afanasy Vyazemsky, the treasurer Funikov, and many others). Their families were persecuted (as well wives, children of the executed oprichniki, even household members) and all their property and estates were confiscated by the state. What followed was a new wave of executions, this time wiping out the inner circle that had formed around the Tsar after the purge of the oprichnina elite.

One wonders, do the sectarians of Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect — those embedded in law enforcement, the FSB, the prosecutor’s office, the judiciary, and even the highest levels of government — really want such a fate for themselves? As they set the state’s repressive machine in motion, do they ever consider their own future or the fate of their families? Because history has a habit of repeating itself.

But let us return to the pivotal year for the expansion of Dvorkin’s power: 2009.

• March 16–18, 2009: As previously noted, the president of RACIRS, A. Dvorkin, had a three-day working trip to the capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana. The visit was made at the invitation of Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice Zagipa Baliyeva and the Director of the International Center for Cultures and Religions (ICCR) under the Ministry of Justice, A. P. Abuov.
• February 18, 2009: A historic document for Dvorkin’s rise through the power vertical.

Russia’s Ministry of Justice issued Order No. 53  of February 18, 2009, and approved the “Procedure for Conducting State Religious Evaluation” and the “Regulations on Expert Council on State Religious Evaluation under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.” This document emerged as a direct result of another legal instrument in which Alexander Dvorkin himself had a hand (for his own benefit, of course). Specifically, based on Federal Law No. 160-FZ of July 23, 2008 “On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Relative to Improving the Exercise of Authority by the Government of the Russian Federation”, the Ministry of Justice was granted the authority to define the procedures for conducting state religious studies evaluations. Let us recall that at the time, the head of the Russian Ministry of Justice was Aleksandr Konovalov — a graduate of the St. Tikhon Orthodox University and a disciple and sectarian of Aleksandr Dvorkin (who was already publicly known for his insulting remarks about various religious movements).

If you read through the “Regulations on the Expert Council” issued by the Ministry of Justice on February 18, 2009 (especially the sections outlining the cases in which the Ministry may request an expert analysis), it becomes clear that Dvorkin’s “experts,” like the oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible, are effectively granted the right to do almost anything they want, they can harass and discriminate against believers and religious organizations however they see fit.

• March 31, 2009: The Ministry of Justice order from February 18, 2009, officially entered into legal force.
• April 3, 2009. The Expert Council on State Religious Evaluation under the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation was officially established. Naturally, at the very first meeting of this new council, Dvorkin was elected as its chairman. The composition of this “expert” council is discussed in more detail in the article “Legalized Sadists. The Totalitarian Sect of Dvorkin” As a reminder, it included representatives of RACIRS — sectarians of Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect, including Dvorkin’s closest associates: Russian Orthodox Church priest Lev Semyonov (executive secretary of both RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies and the dean of the Faculty of Continuing Education at Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University of Humanities), Yevgeny Mukhtarov, a journalist from Yaroslavl and notorious “anticultist” known for his attacks on various religious movements, Roman Silantyev, director of the “human rights center” of the World Russian People’s Council, Aleksandr Shchipkov, a former Orthodox publicist and advisor to Federation Council Speaker Sergey Mironov, and other Dvorkin loyalists. After this elevation to power, Dvorkin evidently saw himself as the ultimate “expert,” assuming the role of a supreme authority with a final word on all matters.

Even back in 2009, smart individuals warned of the dangers and tragic consequences to society that could result from Dvorkin’s rise to power, calling his “Expert Council” a modern-day Inquisition “with oprichnina-like goals and methods,” masked under the leadership of a “monk-minister.”

In particular, Roman Lunkin — editor of the Russian journal “Religion and Law,” a respected sociologist of religion, scholar, and journalist — wrote in 2009:

“The new Expert Council under the Ministry of Justice is quite capable of becoming a punitive organ, rather than a mere formal gathering of academic specialists, because in February the ministry already expanded the powers of this council.”

In his analysis of the new “Regulations on the Expert Council,” Lunkin pointed out that “the number of grounds for initiating a state religious studies evaluation had significantly increased.” He emphasized that “such ‘reviews’ (especially considering the Dvorkin-dominated composition of the council) would be used to declare organizations extremist, to label literature extremist (that is, to compile ‘banned book lists’), and to pursue cases personally targeting members of religious communities.” And that was said in 2009. It is now 2025, and that is exactly what is happening in Russia.

The Ministry of Justice on the Warpath. Instead of an Expert Council on State Religious Evaluation, Justice Minister Aleksandr Konovalov Creates an “Orthodox Druzhina (Militia)”

April 6, 2009

One could have expected many things from a top government body like the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, but certainly not an open declaration of war against Russian civil society in the form of religious organizations outside the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, the Justice Ministry took this unexpected step by forming an Expert Council on State Religious Evaluation that, to put it mildly, can only be described as an inquisition. The Ministry of Justice — headed by the Orthodox Christian (and reportedly monastic) Aleksandr Konovalov, a graduate of the St. Tikhon Orthodox University and a disciple of “sect expert” A. Dvorkin — delayed the official announcement of the Council’s full composition. However, it was already known that the minister’s teacher, A. Dvorkin, would be included. On April 3, at the Council’s first meeting, Dvorkin was elected chairman — meaning that the majority of the other members, who, unlike their new supervisor, actually hold real academic degrees certified by the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation and still consider themselves scholars, will now be held hostage by the mental state of the “sect expert” Dvorkin.

All those who might have challenged Dvorkin — and done so boldly — were excluded from the new council.

The new Expert Council under the Russian Ministry of Justice is fully capable of becoming a punitive body rather than merely a formal gathering of academic experts, especially given that the ministry had already expanded the council’s powers back in February. The number of grounds for initiating a state religious studies examination was increased.

In particular, such “expert evaluations” (and given the composition of the council, it’s hard not to put that word in quotation marks) will now be conducted in cases involving the designation of organizations as extremist, the labeling of literature as extremist (i.e., for the creation of “indexes of forbidden books”), and in matters related personally to members of religious associations.

Human Rights Activists Sectually Concerned

A scandal is flaring up around the Ministry of Justice’s new expert council on religious studies.

The expert council on state religious evaluation, recently established by Russia’s Ministry of Justice, has sparked concern among human rights advocates. They warn that Alexander Dvorkin, a well-known anti-cult activist who now heads the council could use his position, employing state backing, to shut down religious organizations disfavored by the Russian Orthodox Church. Council members, however, dismiss these accusations as unfounded and emphasize that the expert council has not even begun its work.

On Wednesday, the website of the human rights organization Slavic Legal Center (SLC), which has provided legal assistance to religious organizations since 1993, published an open appeal to Russian Minister of Justice Alexander Konovalov, urging the removal of individuals from the expert council whom human rights advocates believe are not qualified religious scholars. 

Their discontent was caused by the inclusion in the council: Alexander Dvorkin (who was elected chair at the council’s first meeting on April 3), Alexander Kuzmin, Yevgeny Mukhtarov, Andrei Vasilchenko (who, in addition to his anti-cult work, writes books about the history of the Third Reich), and Orthodox priest Lev Semyonov.

The concerns raised by legal experts and scholars of religion were far from unfounded. On July 27, 2009, Russian Minister of Justice Alexander Konovalov officially approved Regulations on establishing a council under the Ministry of Justice tasked with reviewing religious informational materials for signs of “extremism.” “The council shall provide assessments on the presence or absence of extremist content in religious literature, as well as in printed, audio, video, and other informational materials published and distributed by religious organizations, or used in worship services and other religious rites.”

The paradox of the situation lay in the fact that the council’s mandate was to identify exactly the kind of activity in which Alexander Dvorkin and his totalitarian sect have been actively engaged: disseminating informational materials that incite religious hatred, degrade the dignity of citizens based on their religious beliefs, and promote the notion of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of individuals on the basis of their religious affiliation.

July 27, 2009

Council under the Ministry of Justice to review religious materials for extremism

Russian Minister of Justice Alexander Konovalov approved the regulations for a council under the Ministry of Justice to examine religious informational materials for signs of extremism. The council can include representatives of religious organizations and scholars in the field of religious studies.

The council shall provide assessments on the presence or absence of extremist content in religious literature, as well as in printed, audio, video, and other informational materials published and distributed by religious organizations, or used in worship services and other religious rites.

The council’s mission is to involve the broader public in identifying and preventing the dissemination of materials that incite religious hatred, degrade the dignity of citizens based on their religious beliefs, and promote the notion of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of individuals on the basis of their religious affiliation.

Delusions of grandeur are indeed marked by a significant overestimation of one’s status in society, as well as of one’s mental and physical traits and capabilities. The key symptom of such a disorder is the patient’s obsessive focus on their own persona. The individual is convinced of their superiority over others and perceives themselves as more powerful, more educated (even in the absence of any corresponding education), more brilliant, more attractive, and as someone endowed with authority. As a result, they’re thinking their judgments are impervious to correction. 

Such a person consciously attempts to convince others that they are famous or possess special abilities beyond those of ordinary people. They demand to be treated in accordance with their self-imagined status of a great persona, expecting special treatment: submission, admiration, and special conditions. In addition to the primary symptom, these patients often exhibit emotional lability, with frequent mood swings — states of excitement and euphoria alternate with anxiety and depression. During periods of remission, their self-esteem remains inflated, they cannot tolerate criticism or accept advice, and they rely exclusively on their own opinion.

The aftermath of Dvorkin’s bacchanalia in 2009 was the May 15–16 FECRIS conference — the European offshoot of Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect — held in Saint Petersburg. As always, Dvorkin cranked up the pomp, turning an ordinary gathering of his sect’s acolytes into what he framed as the “International conference and FECRIS general assembly.” In his mind, this was essentially on the level of a UN General Assembly. At the very least, it was clearly his intent for the public to interpret the banner of his activity in that exact way, when, in truth, its real goal was the opposite: the dismantling of human rights, freedoms, and civil safety.

This conference was held in Russia for the first time, hosted by the Faculty of Law of Saint Petersburg State University — the same faculty where Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, and other future elites once studied. Naturally, Dvorkin and his organizations — RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies — played a major role in organizing and carrying out the FECRIS conference, along with the participation of Saint Petersburg State University itself. This was a unique opportunity for Dvorkin to personally cultivate relations with the leadership and faculty of the university to expand his network and cement the influence of his methods on those in power.

The international core of Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect gathered at the conference, along with those who were either useful or necessary to him for advancing and solidifying his standing on the international stage. Naturally, Dvorkin didn’t forget about himself: the General Assembly elected him Vice President of the federation, since he previously served as a member of the FECRIS board of directors. Overall, it was just another publicity game for those who don’t know who Dvorkin is or what he actually does.

Take a close look at the names of the invited participants. Many of them have long been associated with Dvorkin. Trace their anticult activities. These are individuals who have repeatedly violated human rights and religious freedoms.

The morning plenary session of the conference on May 15 opened with a welcome address to the participants from A. Konovalov, Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation. It was delivered on his behalf by S. Milushkin, Director of the Department for Non-Profit Organizations at the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, who actively participated in the conference throughout both days. Then, I. Dementyev, Vice-Rector of St. Petersburg State University, read a welcome message from the Rector, N. Kropachev. Following this, the President of FECRIS, Friedrich Griess (Austria), addressed the conference participants with a greeting. After him, brief welcome remarks were given by Annelise Oeschger, Honorary President of the Conference of International Non-Governmental Organizations of the Council of Europe (Germany); Henri-Pierre Debord, Advisor to the Interministerial Mission for Vigilance and Action Against Sectarian Aberrations (France); Tassos Mitsopoulos, Member of Parliament of the Republic of Cyprus; and Christophe Calleman, representative of the Belgian Ministry of Justice. The morning session concluded with an extended opening statement by Professor A. Dvorkin.

The afternoon plenary session opened with a report by S. Milushkin, Director of the Department for Non-Profit Organizations at the Russian Ministry of Justice, titled: “Opportunities for Coordinating European and Russian Experience in Counteracting Totalitarian Sects.” Over the following two days of the conference, participants had the opportunity to listen to and discuss presentations by: Hans-Werner Karlhoff, Director of the Interministerial Working Group on Sects and Psychocults of Baden-Württemberg (Germany); O. Shishov, Mayor of Ryazan (read by O. Kalugin, Assistant to the Head of the Ryazan City Administration); Thomas Gandow, Commissioner for Sects and Worldviews of the Lutheran Church of Berlin-Brandenburg (Germany); Graham Berry, attorney (USA); Jean-Pierre Jougla, attorney (France); Michael Drebing (Germany); Lucia Grešková, Deputy Director of the Government Bureau on Cult Issues (Slovakia); V. Martinovich, President of the Center of St. Joseph of Volokolamsk and consultant to the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church; Per Kornhall (Sweden); A. Kuzmin, Head of the Saratov Branch of the Center for Religious Studies (Russia); Anna Marinova, member of the Administrative Council of the Center for the Study of New Religious Movements and Associate Professor at Sofia University (Bulgaria); E.  Mukhtarov, Head of the Yaroslavl Anticult Center “Civic Security” (Russia); Zoran Luković, President of the Center for Anthropological Studies, and Andrey Protić, board member of that Center (Serbia); V. E. Petukhov, Chairman of the Center for the Protection of Family and Personality (Ukraine); and Thomas Sackville, Vice President of FECRIS, board member of the Family Protection Foundation, and former First Deputy Minister of the Interior of the United Kingdom.

“Active participation in the conference — particularly in chairing sessions and discussing presentations — was taken by FECRIS Vice President Danièle Muller-Tulli (Switzerland), who is responsible for the Federation’s relations with the Council of Europe, the UN, and both European and global non-governmental organizations.

During the conference, Russian Minister of Justice A. Konovalov met with the FECRIS leadership and the rector of St. Petersburg State University, N. Kropachev, in the latter’s office. A similar meeting was also held at the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, where a group of conference participants was received by Constitutional Court Judge S. Kazantsev.”

And after the conference, for some of its participants, all those “epic” meetings and agreements concluded with a ritual.

The Orthodox clergy and laypeople who took part in the conference attended various churches in St. Petersburg on Sunday morning, where they had the opportunity to participate in the Divine Liturgy and venerate holy relics. Metropolitan Nathaniel of Nevrokop (Bulgarian Orthodox Church), Bishop Christoforos of Karpasia (Cypriot Orthodox Church), Father Lev Semyonov (executive secretary of RACIRS and the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons; dean of the Continuing Education Department at Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University of Humanities), Father Arseny Vilkov (chairman of the Missionary Department of the Ryazan Diocese), and reader A. Dvorkin visited the house church of St. Anastasia the Deliverer from Bonds at the children’s shelter “House of Mercy” on Sunday. Metropolitan Nathaniel and Bishop Christoforos prayed in the altar, while Fathers Lev Semyonov and Arseny Vilkov concelebrated with the church’s rector, Archpriest Alexander Stepanov. After the Divine Liturgy and a brotherly meal, the hierarchs and priests visited the Smolensk Cemetery, where they went to the chapel of St. Xenia of St. Petersburg, venerated the holy relics, and received anointing with oil.

As a result, following this conference, as early as by July 2009, thanks to the “productive efforts of FECRIS Vice President Ms. Danièle Muller-Tulli,” Dvorkin established a presence at the United Nations. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), at one of its sessions, granted FECRIS consultative status — specifically, special consultative status.

It is worth recalling that since 2005, FECRIS has held the status of a non-governmental organization participant in the Council of Europe. Special consultative status with ECOSOC allows participation in ECOSOC events and conferences, the ability to submit information and recommendations, access to key documents, and the opportunity to collaborate with other organizations.

How Dvorkin’s Sect Contributed to the Decline in Patriarch Kirill’s Approval Ratings

As for the relationship between Dvorkin and Kirill, beyond Dvorkin’s demonstrative zeal in rooting out “sectarians” even within the Russian Orthodox Church itself, another obvious point stands out. Patriarch Kirill’s approval rating was at its highest in 2009, the year he became Patriarch. This indicates that when Kirill assumed the patriarchal office, he enjoyed public respect both as a political and religious leader. In 2009, Patriarch Kirill ranked sixth among the 100 most influential politicians in Russia (whereas in 2008, the then-Patriarch Alexy II was in 10th place). Notably, until 2015, Kirill remained in the top ten of the country’s political elite. But by 2021, his rating had plummeted. Why?

Experts say that “it’s very difficult to understand why his rating dropped.” Speculation varies widely. However, there are also quite objective reasons that remain largely outside public awareness. It was during this period that the influence of Dvorkin’s totalitarian sect increased — both within Russia and on the international stage. So how are all of these developments connected?

Patriarch Kirill’s rating was shaped by three components: media visibility, social (religious) influence, and political standing. It is commonly believed that the media component declined during the pandemic. The Patriarch was largely absent from the media space, and in accordance with the laws of sociology and mass psychology, his ratings declined accordingly. By that time, Dvorkin already had access to an expansive media network, including outlets abroad. For example, efforts to discredit the Church of Scientology alone were generating up to 1,000 publications per week across different countries — not to mention what was happening domestically!

Next, a religious leader’s popularity among the public is directly tied to his reputation. It is worth recalling that a number of events during Kirill’s patriarchate were of a discrediting nature and indirectly undermined the image of the Patriarch himself. Once again, these events are linked to the names of Dvorkin’s “sectarians” and his closest friends and allies.

For example, there were high-profile controversies involving Archpriest Andrei Kuraev and Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who raised the issue of publicly defining the boundary between church property and the personal finances of clergy. There was also the “resurfacing” of the story about the 300-million-ruble inheritance left behind by the late Patriarch, along with many other contentious matters.

There were scandals surrounding the exposure of numerous “sectarians” within the Russian Orthodox Church, despite their long-standing service and public respect. Again, all of this happened with the involvement of Dvorkin and his associates, who covertly supported intra-Church opposition and wielded broad influence over public opinion through mass media outlets.

“Comparable to Victims of Fake Gurus”: Religious Scholar Alexander Dvorkin Speaks About Pseudo-Elders

June 6, 2024

But the keynote speaker was Alexander Dvorkin, president of the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons — arguably the Russian Orthodox Church’s leading ‘sectologist.’ His center has been studying various sects and assisting their victims for several decades.

“In recent years, the largest number of people coming to us for help are those who have suffered at the hands of pseudo-Orthodox sects and pseudo-elders. Their numbers are comparable to the victims of so-called fake online gurus, or psychological cults focused on personal growth, coaching, and similar areas,” Dvorkin stated.

According to him, some 20 years ago, there were fewer victims of sects. By how much remains unclear, as no exact figures were provided. However, the cited concrete examples, including by name, were plenty.

June 20, 2024

What Lies Behind the Dispute Between Dvorkin and Tkachev: A Debate over Pseudo-Eldership Ignites in the Russian Orthodox Church

Hardline moralists within church and pseudo-church circles must be feeling uneasy right now. They’re watching a clash between the most popular missionary of the Russian Orthodox Church and a group of committed anticult fighters. People of the faith are likely bewildered: both sides are unwaveringly loyal to official Church doctrine, refuse to yield even a sliver of spiritual truth to the so-called “Orthodox liberals,” and uphold impeccably conservative beliefs — yet here we have an unpleasant case of intraspecies warfare.

It all began with the conference “Spiritual Eldership and Pseudo-Eldership,” which was expected to “thrash out” exorcist Vladimir Golovin. He was a relatively safe target for criticism, as he had already been defrocked by a church court in 2019. But then, unexpectedly, Fr. Alexander Kuzmin mentioned the popular missionary and blogger Fr. Andrei Tkachev in an unfavorable context. Tkachev had recently replaced the “liberal” Fr. Alexei Uminsky as rector of a major Moscow parish. Notably, that same parish had also been home to Alexander Dvorkin, president of the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects (RACIRS), who served there as an altar server.

Though Dvorkin had distanced himself from Uminsky after the latter left for the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, he also failed to find common ground with Tkachev. And after the conference, Dvorkin aligned himself with Kuzmin’s opinion that Tkachev exhibits signs of “pseudo-eldership.”

At first, the spat could have been written off as personal animosity between the anticultist and the missionary. But the ripples quickly spread through the blogosphere. Fr. Alexander Novopashin, another prominent figure, joined the fray. He criticized the “carnival-like expressiveness and vulgar expressions of the preacher” and made claims about “the content of his speeches — medical dissidence and occult views on the nature of being.” Novopashin, Kuzmin, and Dvorkin are all part of the RACIRS team. But it’s unlikely they would enter the fray just to settle scores on behalf of their boss. The situation is clearly taking a dangerous turn: Novopashin claims that Tkachev’s opponents are being threatened with reprisals by the missionary’s many fans.

And finally, what brings the heaviest reputational damage are the accusations against the Patriarch for attempting to incorporate religious presence into the secular state and society — going beyond the limits established by current legislation. And who initiated and actively pursued this in recent years? Dvorkin and his totalitarian sect.

Dvorkin’s activity is documented everywhere: he aggressively lobbied for amendments to laws on religious organizations that would allow practically any new religious formation, religious-philosophical teaching, cultural-educational, or wellness institution to be classified as “undesirable” or extremist groups. He and his sectarians actively pushed for the “theologization” of secular education.

In his fiefdoms (territories under the control of RACIRS), there was a forced acceleration of church building, contrary to the interests of local residents. Moreover, scandals involving the press unfolded repeatedly along the same pattern, leading to conflicts between authorities and civil society.(28)

So, who is the conductor of this “symphony” of lawlessness and the creation of conflict hotbeds? Who consistently turned society against the Patriarch by spreading rumors through “talking heads” that he “is already worn out by age,” “the Patriarch no longer governs the Church,” or “when will His Little Holiness die”?(29)

Back in 2017, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Interreligious Council of Russia, the Chief Rabbi of Russia (CJROAR), Adolf Shaevich, told Patriarch Kirill: “I am amazed by your forbearance — you tolerate people who consider themselves holier than the Patriarch.” To which the head of the ROC responded: “Where do we get the hatred from? From the media. That’s where it boils!” Those words remain relevant to this day, don’t they?

It’s important to understand that psychopaths like Dvorkin are masters of mimicry. They can imitate any emotion, slip into social roles, weave intrigues, gossip, commit vile acts — all to provoke a desired reaction in another person. Psychopaths take pride in their ability to lie. Their talent for deceiving both friends and foes allows them to keep their actions hidden, manipulate people behind the scenes, stir up intrigue, commit fraud and theft. 

Even when caught in a lie, they simply change the subject or twist the facts until the lie appears to be the truth. The driving force behind psychopaths like Dvorkin is a ruthless pursuit of power and personal gain. Their mimicry is so refined that they can convince government officials, judges, and other experts of their righteousness. Such individuals may come across as brilliant intellectuals, even publishing academic work, but in time, it becomes clear that their words do not match their actions, and their deeds contradict their public statements.

It’s obvious that if Dvorkin’s lawlessness continues, we’re headed for something far worse than papocaesarism, where the top church leader holds both secular and religious power. Nor will it be сaesaropapism, where the state rules over the church. This will be theocratic Dvorkinism, where both secular and religious power are concentrated in the hands of a psychopath. The only question is whether people truly want a future full of blood for themselves and their children.

After all, in the later stages of delusions of grandeur, a patient’s aggression tends to increase, and their delusional ideas become bizarre and detached from reality. Such individuals often see themselves as rulers of mankind, lords of the galaxy, or saviors of the downtrodden. Where all this might lead, and how it could affect those around them, remains unknown. If the manic phase of the delusion is intense enough, it may evolve into reformist delusions, messianic delusions, or antagonistic delusions, where the patient sees themselves as the center of a cosmic battle between existential opposites like life and death, good and evil, light and darkness.

This may also be accompanied by affective disorders, hallucinations, or clouded consciousness. The ability to perceive reality adequately becomes impaired. The patient may experience emotions with no clear origin, see visions, hear voices, or feel touches and tingling sensations. Delusions of grandeur are an attempt by the patient to explain these inner experiences. But since there is no connection to reality, the patient’s ideas are inconsistent, the conclusions random, and the content often fictional or fantastical in nature. At the same time, they find no relief from their condition. They become impulsive and prone to irrational actions. In such cases, elevated moods frequently give way to anxiety and fear.  Delusions of grandeur are often accompanied by delusions of persecution. And considering that any activity resembling an inquisitorial campaign could trigger unpredictable responses in the minds of such individuals, one can only imagine the harm a person like Dvorkin could inflict — unless he is stopped in time.

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